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Abstract 
 
The hukou system, also known as the Household Registration System, has had a 
significant impact on China’s social, political, and economic trajectory since the time of 
its implementation in 1958. Specifically, it has helped to create the societal-wide 
imbalance between the prosperous coastal cities along the eastern seaboard and the 
lagging rural countryside of China’s interior provinces, where a second class group of 
citizens has emerged. As a result, the central government has strategically begun to 
increase the minimum wage nation-wide, as evidenced by the 12th Five Year Plan. The 
repercussions of this are potentially enormous, not only for low-paid workers in China 
but also for world-wide consumers of Chinese products and competing producers. This 
paper delves into this topic and speculates on both the positive and negative implications 
of an increased minimum wage moving forward. Furthermore, this paper speculates on 
the future of the hukou system. Is the hukou system too deeply rooted in society, or will 
an increased minimum wage lead to the erosion of the system?  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Early in the morning on January 23, 2010 the body of a nineteen-year-old migrant 
worker at Foxconn was found disembodied in front of his high-rise dormitory. After a 
police investigation, it was concluded that Ma Xiangqian leapt from a high floor of the 
building and fell to his death. The suicide came relatively soon after he had been demoted 
to cleaning the factory’s toilets, simply after he accidentally broke two pieces of 
machinery while at work. Moreover, after some media investigation of Ma’s working 
condition in the month before he died, it was found that he had worked 112 hours of 
overtime (three times the legal limit) for the approximate equivalent of one dollar per 
hour (Barboza 2010). Ma’s suicide was just the first of a cluster of fourteen suicides, with 
eighteen attempted suicides, that occurred between January and November 2010 at 
Foxconn production plants. All of the people who jumped from buildings were between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, and most were relatively new workers at Foxconn.   
Foxconn Technology Group is a subsidiary of the Taiwanese company Hon Hai 
Precision Industry Company. Foxconn is generally regarded as the world’s leading 
electronic manufacturer; it makes products for Apple, Sony, Dell, HP, Motorola and 
Nintendo, to name a few. They currently employ approximately one million people in 
China, with approximately 400,000 workers at the Longhua plant in Shenzhen alone.  
The Foxconn suicides were a widely reported event in the international media. 
They shed light on the deplorable working conditions and wage rates of the migrant 
laborers employed there. Some reports have portrayed Foxconn as a labor camp with 
military style rigor. For instance, stringent production quotas are set daily for each 
worker, though these may have subsided somewhat by now. Additionally, the labor force 
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is strictly disciplined and faces pay docks for not adhering to the rules. Some of the rules 
are quite bizarre by Western standards. For instance, the following things were prohibited: 
“having long nails, being late, yawning, eating, sitting on the floor, talking or walking 
quickly” (Malone and Jones). Moreover, the pay for dealing with this appalling treatment 
is meager. One media source reported that in 2010 Foxconn workers were paid a base 
salary of 132 dollars per month, not including overtime work which can pay one and a 
half times the standard hourly rate (Dean). These rates are not much above subsistence 
level, especially given the increasing cost of living in China’s coastal cities.  
The magnitude of attention that these events drew was enormous. It put pressure 
on U.S. companies associated with Foxconn to address the situation, most notably Apple. 
In response to these incidents, on June 1, 2010 at the All Things Digital Conference Steve 
Jobs is quoted as saying, “It’s not a sweatshop…You go in this place and it's a factory but, 
my gosh, they’ve got restaurants and movie theatres and hospitals and swimming pools. 
For a factory, it's pretty nice” (Malone and Jones). Perhaps Jobs was completely 
misinformed, or, more likely, he was trying to divert negative attention away from the 
company.  
Though the Foxconn suicide cluster is a tragedy, one upside that can be taken 
away from this occurrence is that it was a catalyst for a change at Foxconn. In response to 
the suicides, Foxconn increased workers’ wages by about thirty percent. This pay raise 
was badly deserved and much overdue. Foxconn also brought in Buddhist monks and 
social workers as an outlet for the factory workers. As a precautionary measure for 
potential jumpers, the company installed netting around the base of all tall buildings and 
made each worker sign a no suicide pledge.  
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The initiative taken at Foxconn production plants in the wake of the tragedies to 
better the lives of the workers was commendable. However, the workers there represent 
only a small fraction of the overall total factory population in China. Millions of factory 
workers are still mistreated in China’s key production hubs along the eastern seaboard, 
some of which are Shenzhen, Guangdong, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River 
Delta. In total, China has approximately 167 million migrant workers that travel outside 
their home provinces to find work in factories or other manual labor positions (Zhu); 
however, the number of migrant workers has shown some decline in recent years. The 
troubles at Foxconn illuminate the need to thoroughly address the way in which factory 
workers are treated and compensated in all of the country’s factories. The colossal 
magnitude of workers in Chinese factories particularly underscores the need for change, 
as proactive measures would better the lives of such a vast population. Foxconn has given 
the world a startling insight into the inner workings of large-scale production plants, and 
perhaps it is the reason as to why the Chinese government has recently begun to increase 
the minimum wage. 
The emergence of a higher minimum wage in China is a relevant and timely 
happening for people around the globe; it could potentially affect both producers and 
consumers of Chinese-made goods, as well as low paid workers in other countries 
competing with China to produce low-end manufacturing goods, such as Mexico, India, 
Bangladesh, and Vietnam, just to name a few. The following paper examines the Chinese 
labor market for migrant workers1 from a social, political and economic prospective. 
                                                          
1
 The term migrant worker refers to all people who work outside the province in which their hukou is 
registered. Not all migrant workers are unskilled, some are highly educated; however, skilled migrant 
workers are only a small proportion of the overall migrant population. This paper mainly refers to migrant 
workers as the unskilled proportion of the migrant population. 
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Specifically, the paper seeks to understand why the central government has decided to 
raise the minimum wage now. This paper has found that there are three major factors that 
led to the wage increase: high inequality, uneven labor shortages, and social instability. 
These three things were all caused by the hukou system, also known as the Household 
Registration System. Furthermore, this paper speculates on the positive and negative 
repercussions of an increased minimum wage moving forward.  The positive implications 
of an increased minimum wage could possibly include structurally rebalancing the 
societal-wide distribution of income in the long-run, drawing more migrants back to work 
in the factories, and quelling migrants’ social unrest and protests. The negative 
implications of an increased minimum wage could be increased business operations cost 
and decreased competitiveness of Chinese goods on the world market. Lastly, this paper 
examines the implications that an increased minimum wage may have on the current state 
and future of the hukou system. On the one hand, some may argue the hukou system is 
deeply rooted in society and higher wages may have no effect on the relevancy of the 
system in society. On the other hand, some may argue an increased minimum wage may 
lead to the eventual erosion of the system because with more disposable income migrants 
will be able to more fully integrate into urban society. This paper will offer evidence to 
support the latter view.  
 
Features of China’s Current Labor Market: 
 
Before continuing with the discussion of minimum wage in China, it is important 
to contextualize China’s current labor market. The most important feature of the labor 
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market is its dualistic structure due to the hukou system. Similar to the way in which 
some societies discriminate based upon one’s race, ethnicity, religion, caste, etc., the 
hukou system is a form of institutional exclusion that discriminates based upon one’s 
place of birth. At birth, each citizen is registered either with urban hukou, the privileged 
class, or rural hukou, the underprivileged class.  
It is a system that is still very much in effect today. In terms of the breakdown of 
the rural versus urban population, some estimates show that sixty percent of the total 
population have rural hukou, or approximately 760 million Chinese citizens (PRC Bureau 
of Statistics). However, it should be noted that some rules and restrictions pertaining to 
the hukou system have eased significantly since the time of its implementation in 1958. 
Today, the three main functions of the system are resource allocation, internal migration 
control, and management of politically targeted people. While migration restrictions have 
lifted somewhat, the rural population must still seek governmental approval in order to 
move or work in a new locality. Three other important things that have also helped to 
shape the trajectory of the labor market are: the recent policy initiatives of the Hu-Wen 
administration, the Chinese Communist Party regime (henceforth referred to as CCP), 
and the Global Economic Crisis of 2008-09.  
The commencement of the Hu-Wen administration in 2003 marked the first 
administration of the CCP in some time that has made inclusive economic growth a top 
policy objective, and the 12th Five Year Plan issued under this administration is a case in 
point of this. Five Year Plans are very important central government documents. Every 
five years the CCP publishes its economic goals and initiatives that will be carried out 
over the period. Three key themes of the 12th Five Year Plan are economic restructuring, 
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social equality, and environmental protection. The plan was issued in 2011 and will be 
referenced throughout the paper. The following figure exhibits some of its specific goals.  
 
Figure 1. 
 
(Source: 12th Five Year Plan) 
 
The 12th Five Year Plan will surely change the face of Chinese business and have a 
definitive impact on the labor market.  
 
 
Increase Foreign Investment 
• Welcome foreign 
investment in modern 
agriculture, high-tech 
and environment 
protection industries 
 
Increase High-end 
Manufacturing and Enlarge 
the Service Sector: 
• Turn coastal regions 
from "world's factory" 
to hubs of R&D and 
high-end 
manufacturing  
• Develop nuclear power 
more efficiently while 
establishing more 
safety measures 
• Construct large-scale 
hydropower plants in 
southwest China 
• Expand the service 
sector by 4 percent as a 
percentage of GDP by 
2015 
 
Goals of the 12th Five 
Year Plan: 
Urbanization: 
• Urbanization rate will 
reach 51.5 percent 
 
Social Equality: 
• Expand the urban 
insurance coverage by 
100 million people by 
2015 
• Raise the minimum 
wage by 13 percent 
annually  
• Promote domestic 
consumption over 
investments and exports 
 
Build Infrastructure: 
• Length of high-speed 
railway will reach 
45,000 km 
• Length of highway 
network will reach 
83,000 km 
• Build 36 million 
apartments for low-
income residents 
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The CCP regime has also played a role in shaping China’s labor market into what 
it is today. Since the CCP is fully in control of the entire electoral process, China’s top 
eight politburo members in the politburo standing committee were not elected by popular 
vote. Instead, each politburo member in power selects his successor, regardless of public 
opinion. So, China’s massive population is ruled by a small group of eight politburo 
leaders at the top of the central government hierarchy. As a result, the CCP is a regime 
that is historically insular, paranoid, and very reactive to incidents that threaten its 
legitimacy (Shirk). This plays a role in the reason why China has enacted such strict and 
pervasive censorship laws. The Chinese media is rigorously censored for content that 
may lead to social unrest or challenging of the CCP’s authority. In fact, the internet 
censorship effort has been so extensive that it has been dubbed “The Great Firewall” in 
Western Media. In addition to China’s vigilant censorship, the CCP also limits the voice 
of the people by allowing for only one state-controlled labor union called the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions, and all other labor unions are essentially illegal. Unlike 
traditional U.S. labor unions whose main purpose is to act in favor of workers’ wellbeing, 
China’s labor union is not proactive in overseeing workers’ wellbeing and often cedes to 
government pressure (Bradsher and Barboza). The insular, paranoid, and reactive way in 
which the CCP conducts itself has played a definite role in the shaping the labor market.   
Lastly, the third feature of China’s labor market worth noting is that the economy 
is currently recovering (or some would say has fully recovered) from the Global 
Financial Crisis. China began experiencing diminished demand for its goods toward the 
end of 2007, and factories started closing their doors in 2008. It is estimated that 670, 000 
labor-intensive factories shutdown during that period (“Welcome Home”). The time 
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period before and after the crisis stands as an anomaly to China’s economic and labor 
trends over the past thirty years. The Global Economic Crisis quickly and severely 
dampened worldwide demand for Chinese products, and the low-skilled labor market was 
gravely affected. Estimates show that twenty-three million migrant workers were laid off 
over the span of just a few months (Chan). During the height of the crisis, the central 
government froze the minimum wage in an attempt to stabilize employment; the freeze 
lasted from November 2008 to February 2010 (“Wages in China”).   
The Chinese economy was able to bounce back fairly quickly, in part due to a 
massive 586 billion dollar stimulus package put into effect by the central government 
from 2009 to 2011. In it, policymakers made a decisive commitment to stimulate the 
interior provinces via a variety of social programs and job creation schemes. Millions of 
new jobs were created for the rural population, especially in construction positions. 
Today, the global demand for Chinese goods is vigorous, and migrant labor is back in 
high demand. The following section provides some data on past and present minimum 
wage trends.  
 
Past and Present Minimum Wages: 
 
China’s minimum wage has been increasing rapidly across the nation. The 
minimum wage varies by locality, and is set in accordance with the local living costs, 
with relation to housing prices in particular (“Minimum Wage Levels Across China”). So, 
as can be expected, the minimum wage is set highest in China’s most prosperous coastal 
regions, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, where the cost of living is 
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relatively higher, whereas the minimum wage is set relatively lower in the poorer interior 
provinces. Minimum wage in China is set to a monthly standard. The map below 
provides an indication of the monthly minimum wage level of each province based upon 
the provincial capital’s minimum wage, measured in yuan. The exact dollar to yuan 
conversion rate varies daily; at the present date, the conversion rate is approximately one 
dollar to 6.27 yuan (Coinmill.com). 
 
Figure 2. 
 
(Source: “Minimum Wage Levels Across China”) 
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In terms of the dollar, the minimum wage averages to be around 175 dollars per month in 
the most expensive coastal cities.  
At 1,300 yuan per month, or approximately 207 dollars, Guangzhou has one of 
the highest minimum wages (“Wages in China”). The current minimum wage in this city 
was set by the “Circular on Adjusting the Minimum Wage Standards of Enterprise 
Employees in Guangdong Province” which was released by the Guangdong Provincial 
Government on January 18, 2012. This latest release followed in quick succession to the 
previous minimum wage hike in Guangzhou, which was issued just eight months before 
in May 2010. Likewise, other provinces nation-wide have been increasing the frequency 
and magnitude in which they have been adjusting their minimum wages. Moving forward, 
the central government has high hopes for minimum wage upgrades and has set 
aggressive minimum wage quotas to reflect this. For example, the 12th Five Year Plan 
states, “Minimum wage standard to increase by no less than thirteen percent on average 
each year. The minimum wage standard in vast majority of areas to reach no less than 
forty percent of the average wage of the local urban employees” (12th Five Year Plan). 
The feasibility of this lofty objective will be discussed later on.   
Despite the fact that, as of late, China’s lowest paid migrant workers have seen a 
substantial increase in their pay, historically, migrant workers were well underpaid. A 
national minimum wage law was not established until the 1994 Labor Law; previous to 
that, wage was set at each manager’s discretion (“Wages in China”). The 1994 Labor 
Law states that the minimum wage is to be set in order to guarantee that the lowest 
income earned by workers is still adequate to suffice their everyday needs. In accordance 
with this, the minimum wages should be fixed at approximately forty to sixty percent of 
14 
 
the average monthly earnings in that locality (“Wages in China”).  The 1994 Labor Law 
also stipulates the maximum number of overtime hours per month, thirty-six, and the 
compensation rate for overtime work, which is one and a half times the worker’s usual 
rate. In addition, the 1994 Labor Law provides more specifications of workers’ rights 
with regard to the number of days off per year and sets requirements for the humane 
treatment of workers.  
In practice, however, the stipulations in the 1994 Labor Law have not always 
been upheld, resulting in the stagnation of migrants’ wages with respect to China’s 
overall productivity growth, export growth and GDP growth. For example, based upon a 
study conducted by Cai Fang and Wang Meiyan, between 2000 and 2007 workers’ 
marginal product of labor increased by 178.7 percent, but that was only followed by a 
91.8 percent increase in wages (Cai and Wang). A survey conducted by the Hainan Trade 
Union Federation in 2010 further demonstrates that workers have not received proper 
wages despite the Labor Law. It found that one sixth of migrant workers in the province 
earned less than 500 yuan per month, which is far below the minimum wage (“Migrant 
Workers in Hainan”). The survey also found that many of the workers agreed that their 
employers did not uphold the proper working conditions and hours as stipulated in the 
law. One way that large production plants, such as Foxconn, have been able to get around 
paying the full minimum wage is to set up dormitories and meal services for the migrants, 
which helps the company further defray costs by providing meager dormitory and meal 
standards, while paying substantially below minimum wage (“Wages in China”). This 
poses a problem for authorities to regulate because it is difficult to deduce the workers’ 
rightful pay once other forms of payment are taken into account.  
15 
 
In general, China has weak rule of law in comparison to other countries of its 
economic development level. Corruption is a widespread issue within the CCP; 
government officials have the tendency to serve their own needs or the needs of people 
close to them instead of serving the needs of the general population. For instance, 
Michael Martin, a specialist in Asian trade and finance wrote, “The real problem is that 
many Chinese companies don't follow the “law” in China because they have political 
connections or influence at the municipal or provincial level…” (Martin). Historically, 
the CCP does not take a strong response to incidents of companies not complying with 
the law, especially with regard to minimum wage law. Regardless of the issue of 
enforcing the minimum wage, the next chapter gives more specifics on how the hukou 
system has shaped China’s labor market into what it is today.  
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Chapter Two: The Hukou System is the Underlying Cause for China’s Inequality, 
Labor Shortages, and Migrant Unrest  
 
This section returns back to the hukou system to take a more in depth look at how 
exactly it contributed to China’s underlying socioeconomic structure, beginning with a 
historical description of the system since its implementation under Mao Zedong in 1958. 
The hukou system is the fundamental cause of China’s disproportional dispersion of 
wealth, labor shortages, and discontent felt by the migrant workers. It has perhaps made 
the greatest impact on China’s contemporary labor market.  
 
History of Hukou: 
 
During the command economy epoch from 1949 roughly until 1978, China 
utilized a Stalinist growth strategy where key cities were favored and the urban 
population received the majority of government provided services and aid, while the rural 
countryside was disconnected from the welfare state. The hukou system was created as a 
reaction to the Stalinist growth strategy to serve as a means of preventing mass migration 
of rural peasantry to the more favored cities along the eastern seaboard. So, in essence, it 
is a system of planned inequality. Once it was enacted, the peasantry were strictly 
forbidden from traveling outside of their home province, making rural individuals not 
able to achieve their individual comparative advantage in labor. Furthermore, in addition 
to tying the peasants to their land while offering little governmental aid, in 1958 the CCP 
called for the collectivization of rural land and restricted its conversion to nonagricultural 
uses, both of which added to the detriment of the rural population’s economic wellbeing 
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and perpetuated an underclass of citizens. As a result of the hukou system, a huge 
agglomeration of undereducated and very poor citizens accumulated in the countryside 
while the coastal cities advanced, especially after China opened its doors to the 
international market in 1978.  
 Mao Zedong’s ultimate successor, Deng Xiaoping, was the leader responsible for 
allowing China to begin trade with the outside world. He developed the motto “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics,” meaning that a socialist society and capitalist economy are 
not mutually exclusive. Personal incentives were reintroduced and State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) were gradually privatized. He also reinstated the “Four 
Modernizations” Policy, which sought to achieve advances in the following four areas: 
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science/technology. Overall, Deng is 
considered to be one of China’s most revered politicians, and his ideologies helped China 
unleash its economic dynamism in the 1980s. Once China opened its doors to the rest of 
the world in 1978, it latched onto a labor-intensive, export-oriented economic model and 
reached rapid economic advances (Rodrik). The hukou system is responsible for China’s 
comparative advantage in cheap labor, which was essential in China’s ability to price its 
goods lower than its competition and establish this model so effectively.  
In the years after China began its export-oriented model, hukou restrictions on 
rural peasantry migration slowly began to ease in order to allow them to migrate to the 
cities to fulfill labor needs created by the global demand for inexpensive Chinese goods 
(Wang). The migration was gradual at first, but has picked up considerably from the mid-
1980s to the present, most notably from 1988 to 2000 (See Figure 3). Though the rural 
peasantry were now able to migrate outside of their home locality to find work, they still 
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could not attain jobs based upon their own comparative advantage because they were 
assigned to undesirable manual labor positions, most typically factory positions. In the 
workplace migrants faced low wages and wage arrears, lack of written contracts, long 
working hours, short weekly rest periods, low social security coverage, poor housing 
conditions, and difficulties in accessing public services (Shi). As a further detriment to 
their wellbeing, migrants were (and still are) technically considered to be part of the rural 
population, and therefore they did not receive equal access to government subsidized 
services, such as education, health care, social insurance, and government housing.  
 
Effects of Hukou: 
 
The term “shallow urbanization” has emerged to characterize the way in which 
migrants live and work in cities but are not integrated into society. Another term, 
“temporary contract workers,” was coined by the government as a way for it to justify the 
unequal appropriation of rights, despite the fact that many workers lived in their city for a 
number of years. For instance, in Beijing, most rural migrants live there for 
approximately five years, which is hardly “temporary” (Rongjiao). The hukou system is a 
direct cause for the economic disparities between the rural and urban population that 
currently persist in China today, and chapter three will continue with this topic to show 
that the economic inequality is one of the three main reasons that the CCP has begun to 
raise the minimum wage.  
Additionally, the hukou system is responsible for the labor shortages in China’s 
factories that have occurred in the past few years. After years of mistreatment, migrants 
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have begun to show a diminished desire to seek employment in China’s production hubs. 
Historically, factory jobs were in high demand; long lines of people would wait outside 
of newly opened factories for the chance to meet a recruiter (Chan). As a result of the 
high volume of job seekers, in the eyes of the factory owners, each individual worker was 
expendable; however, this may no longer be the case. The hukou system is responsible 
for the labor shortages because it has increased the real cost and opportunity cost of 
leaving home, especially in light of the rising Consumer Price Index in China. As a result, 
the CCP has begun to raise the minimum wage, as discussed in chapter four.  
The exploited migrant workers have begun to speak out about their grievances. 
They have joined together in large and small-scale protests throughout China. The 
injustices of the hukou system, with the resulting suppressed wages, are the key source of 
their grievances. The hukou system is a direct cause of the social instability amongst 
migrant workers, which is an additional reason that the CCP has started to raise the 
minimum wage. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five.    
As discussed in this chapter, the hukou system has created China’s inequality, 
labor shortages, and social unrest, which then prompted the government to raise the 
minimum wage. In turn, the higher minimum wage will have a feedback effect on the 
hukou system. It will help erode the system by giving the migrants more disposable 
income. This will help them to integrate better into urban society because they will have a 
better standard of living and be able to afford services on their own, and eventually 
become full members of urban society. This set of relationships is demonstrated in the 
following figure. 
       
 Figure 4.  
 
 
       
  
 
 
         (Source: Developed by author)
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Chapter Three: Economic Inequality and the Minimum Wage Increase 
 
The first, and perhaps the most important, reason that the Chinese national 
government is moving to raise the minimum wage is due to the vast economic 
inequalities in China. China’s gross national wealth has accumulated at an extraordinarily 
unprecedented rate over the approximate thirty years since its opening to the world 
economy. China currently boasts the world’s richest man and has the most number of 
billionaires of any country outside the U.S. (Kroll), and this is all despite the fact that 
only a mere three decades ago its global economic impact was practically nonexistent. 
However, while it is true that 600 million people were lifted out of desolate poverty over 
the span of approximately three decades, a very important feature of China’s wealth 
accumulation is that it has been just as inequitable as it has been vast (World Bank).  One 
of the major negative consequences that the income disparity has had on China is low 
domestic consumption levels, which creates an imbalanced economy that is prone to 
macroeconomic shocks. This chapter will further explore how the economic growth came 
to be so uneven and the reasons as to why the inequality has been a direct cause for the 
government to raise minimum wages.  
 
Rural Countryside Got Left Behind:  
 
The groundwork for China’s vast economic inequality between the rural 
countryside and urban centers was set by the hukou system; however, this does not depict 
the entire story. As China was amassing great wealth during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
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government policies at that time were not designed for attaining inclusive wealth 
(Rodrik); rather, they were simply directed towards achieving massive national wealth. 
Consequently, the ruling elites of China captured a lot of the wealth, but at the expense of 
the working class. For instance, Deng’s labor-intensive, export-oriented economic model 
can be embodied in his famous quote: “It is good for some people to get rich first” 
(Whyte). Indeed, some people did get rich first, but others have been left far behind. In 
essence, the CCP’s policy objectives during that time are another instance of planned 
inequality.  
Specifically, the core policy objectives of the national government in the years 
following the implementation of the labor-intensive, export-oriented model were to meet 
high export quotas by setting the quality and price of their exports low. For instance, the 
7th Five Year Plan, which was in effect from 1986 to 1990, stressed the importance of 
reaching lofty production goals. It states that production goals for major industrial and 
agricultural products by 1990 were: “between 425 and 450 million tons for grain, 4.25 
million tons for cotton, 550 billion kWh for electricity, 1 billion tons for raw coal, 150 
million tons for crude oil, and between 55 and 58 million tons for steel” (7th Five Year 
Plan). Under this high export volume economic model, China experienced much success. 
By the late 1980s China had become a major force in the world’s exporting market, and 
has suitably been coined “the world’s factory.” 
The Gini Index, the most commonly cited measure of income inequality, can 
provide data to demonstrate China’s rising inequality. The World Bank has given the 
following definition of the Gini Index:  
The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income 
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received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or 
household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of 
absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini 
index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality (World 
Bank). 
The most recent data on China’s Gini indicator was collected by the World Bank in 2005, 
and it estimated China’s Gini coefficient to be at .425 (World Bank). It is generally 
accepted amongst poverty researchers that anything above 0.4 is potentially socially 
destabilizing, which poses a major problem for the CCP regime. The way in which to 
deal with the inequality gap has been the subject of much political debate in recent years. 
The table below provides all of China’s Gini coefficients that have been collected by the 
World Bank to date. Note the rapid increase since 1984, especially during the 1990s. 
      
Figure 5. 
China’s Gini Indicators 1981-2005 
Year Gini Indicator 
1981 .291 
1984 .277 
1987 .299 
1990 .324 
1993 .355 
1996 .357 
1999 .392 
2002 .426 
2005 .425 
            (Source: the World Bank) 
 
The degree of inequality currently facing China can be attributed to the 
vulnerability of the rural segment of the population under the hukou system, and 
furthermore, the fact that CCP policy objectives during the 1980s and 1990s were 
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focused on the accumulation of massive national wealth with little regard to inclusivity. 
A higher minimum wage would potentially help to structurally redistribute profits 
vertically and laterally across China.  
 
Move Toward Higher Quality Goods: 
 
As China began to export at an astounding rate and amass more wealth in the 
1990s and 2000s, some of China’s policy directives started to change shape. Instead of 
focusing solely on meeting high production quotas, the CCP also set objectives to 
produce higher quality goods (Rodrik). As a country increases the sophistication of its 
export bundle, it is able to achieve more gains from trade and accumulate even greater 
national wealth. The CCP sought to enhance domestic production capabilities by 
partnering with Western companies in joint ventures to gain access to Western 
technology and scientific advances. One way in which the government was able to entice 
Western companies to foster partnerships with Chinese companies was by creating 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ), which are certain zones that allow for considerable tax 
breaks (Rodrik). The Pearl River Delta is one of China’s most prominent SEZs. 
Additionally, the government sought to increase their amount of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and protected and funded select infant industries.   
The government’s initiatives to enhance China’s domestic capabilities have 
proven to be very successful. In a matter of decades, China’s export basket surpassed the 
expected level of sophistication for a country commensurate with China’s development 
stage, a crucial element that let China get rich so quickly (Rodrik). The author of A 
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Modern Chinese Journey to the West, Ulric Killion, wrote, “The export-push strategy, 
including the establishment of free trade zones to foster favorable environment and 
incentive for exporters, provided an invaluable mechanism through which export 
industries quickly became strong enough to be internationally competitive” (Killion). The 
central government’s initiatives to increase the sophistication of China’s export bundle 
were a significant reason for the country’s overwhelming economic success over the past 
thirty years. However, a major shortcoming of the CCP regime at that time was that they 
did not pay enough attention to the dispersion of wealth across the populace.  
China’s transition to a market economy has created vast income inequality; while 
the elite have accumulated massive wealth, the working class people have been left 
behind. Currently, the rural hukou segment of the population does not have nearly the 
amount of disposable income as their urban counterpart, and thus they are not able to 
consume as much as would be expected of a country with a 1.3 billion populace (Wang). 
This is especially true given the typically high savings rate among migrant workers. In 
fact,  due to rising inflation and other factors, household consumption levels in China 
have actually started to fall since 2000 (International Monetary Fund). As a result of 
China’s restrained domestic consumption, the country remains very dependent upon 
external demand to consume its excess production goods, and China’s vulnerability was 
certainly revealed during the Global Financial Crisis.  
The Hu-Wen administration faces the dilemma of dealing with the economic 
disparity between rural and urban hukou holders, and indeed the government has already 
put in place some policies to promote societal rebalancing. Raising the minimum wage 
will promote domestic consumption and facilitate a transition to a consumer based 
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economy, which will help protect China from future instances of global economic 
downturn. While it is still a long way off before Foxconn workers will be able to afford 
the goods they produce every day, it is not improbable to think that it may be a possibility 
at some point in the foreseeable future. 
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Chapter Four: Labor Shortages and the Minimum Wage Increase 
 
In February 2010 media sources started to report that factories were in short 
supply of labor. This disclosure came as a shock to many because just two years previous, 
twenty-three million migrant workers were let go in the wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis (Chan). Despite the blip in the labor market caused by the financial crisis, China is 
currently experiencing high demand for migrant labor that is not met by supply. For 
instance, according to a survey of 222 enterprises in the Pearl River Delta Region that 
was conducted by the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong, ninety percent 
of the enterprises stated they had difficulty in recruiting the desired amount of workers 
(Cai and Wang). As another example, in 2011 the Vice President of the Jinhua Group 
reported that about 500 of the 1,500 people that his company normally employs resigned 
to take a longer than usual New Year holiday (Winter).  
Due to rural Chinese farmers’ historical lack of access to capital, they were 
extremely unproductive, which was reflective in their wages. So, regardless of the poor 
treatment and low wages, rural people used to be eager to find jobs outside of their home 
province because they earned more money working there than they could as peasant 
farmers. However, this eagerness to obtain migrant labor work is no longer the reality. 
Some estimates have shown the rural surplus of working age people to be in excess of 
100 million people (Chan). Hence, there is a structural mismatch between supply and 
demand for labor in China’s production hubs.  
  There are three factors that have exacerbated the labor shortage: a waning desire 
to work in poor conditions with inadequate pay, a gradually aging population, and higher 
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opportunity costs for leaving home. The combination of exploitative working conditions 
and rising opportunity costs has led more and more migrants to choose to stay home. The 
second reason that the central government is going beyond market forces to raise the 
minimum wage is to address the growing labor imbalance. Presumably, this will 
encourage people to come back to the factories to help close the void between supply and 
demand for labor.  
 
Factors Leading to Labor Shortage:  
 
As demonstrated throughout the paper, migrant workers routinely face deplorable 
working conditions when they come to find work in China’s factories. This is coupled 
with the fact that until recently they were compensated at wages that are much below a 
realistic living wage; recall that Mr. Ma, the Foxconn worker who leapt to his death, was 
working for less than one dollar per hour. Furthermore, some migrants are faced with the 
breakup of their family because they are not able to bring their children or spouse to the 
location of their work due to hukou restrictions. So, after the Chinese New Year holiday 
in 2010 in which migrants typically return home to celebrate, it is no wonder that many 
did not return back to the far off factories to continue working.  Highlighting this 
sentiment K.M. Chan, a Professor of Asian Studies wrote: 
 
The rather deplorable (mis)treatments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis 
period in the Pearl River Delta also discouraged some rural migrants from coming back to seek 
work in the region later, even when jobs were available. Some were simply not at all eager to 
return to the exploitative grind of the “world’s factory.” This had the effect of reducing the labor 
supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories (Chan). 
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Furthermore, not only has there been a reduction in the amount new coming workers, but 
the industry also has a remarkably high turnover rate amongst already hired workers. For 
example, in interviews with Foxconn workers conducted in 2010, it was revealed that the 
typical newcomer lasted only a few months (Barboza 2010).  
Coupled with the waning desire to work in the factories, China’s ageing 
population also contributes to the labor shortage. There are simply less people to hire in 
the target age range of sixteen to thirty because of the One Child Policy (Chan).The 
workers in this age range are more desirable because they are more malleable and able to 
handle the strenuous hours. The One Child Policy, enacted in 1979, has gradually 
diminished the supply of young labor by artificially lowering the fertility rate. In 2009, 
for instance, the birth rate for Chinese women was estimated to be 1.65 (Chan). Under the 
One Child Policy, women in urban areas are limited to one child and typically face 
monetary or physical punishment if they do not abide by this. Women in rural areas are 
slightly less restricted, though one child is still encouraged by the government. This 
policy was once thought to be a temporary measure, but as of 2007 the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission has articulated that they have no intent to 
change the One Child Policy in the future. The following table shows the decreasing 
availability of the rural population by age distribution between 2000 and 2010.  
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         Figure 6. 
Distribution of De Facto Rural Population by Age, 2000-2010 (in millions) 
Age Group 2000 2005 2010 
0-4 57.1 44.2 43.3 
5-9 65.0 51.6 47.7 
10-14 87.8 67.6 53.3 
14-19 59.6 65.3 59.4 
20-24 52.9 40.2 66.0 
25-29 67.7 41.7 36.1 
30-34 76.3 56.0 34.2 
35-39 63.6 68.9 49.9 
40-44 46.9 60.9 61.7 
45-49 52.8 48.3 55.2 
50-54 40.2 55.7 42.3 
55-59 29.8 41.8 48 
60-64 26.3 31.1 35.8 
65+ 57.8 71.1 71.6 
Total 783.8 744.5 704.4 
              (Source: Chan) 
 
According to this table, the number of workers in the desired age diminished from 
eighty-eight million, to sixty-eight million, to fifty-three million in the five year periods 
from 2000 to 2004, 2005 to 2009, and 2010 to 2014, respectively (Chan); and this trend 
of a decreasing working age population will become even more pronounced in the future. 
Moreover, while the supply of young workers decreases, the surge in demand for them 
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following the turnaround of the export sector after the Global Financial Crisis has been 
picking up speed.   
As another source of China’s uneven labor shortage, migrant workers face rising 
opportunity costs when deciding to leave home to find work due to increasing living costs 
in the coastal cities. The discrepancy between the cost of living in China’s urban centers 
and rural areas is on the rise. This takes away from migrants’ meager earnings, and may 
make it not worth their while to work in far off factories. One article states, “Now many 
workers in Sichuan say that taking into account expenses, less well paid jobs closer to 
home are beginning to look much more competitive” (“Welcome Home”). Accordingly, 
the China Consumer Price Index has shown a substantial increase from 2.9 in June of 
2010 to 6.4 in June of 2011 (See Figure 7). The rising living cost of China’s expensive 
coastal cities, coupled with the increasing costs of travel, make factory work less 
profitable than it once was.     
As a second rising opportunity cost, migrants must take into account the fact that 
the standard of living in the interior provinces has reached new heights. In the last few 
years, the Hu-Wen administration has sought to improve the general living conditions of 
poor inland provinces and has put this goal at the top of their agenda. Also, due to the 
stimulus plan enacted after the Global Economic Crisis there are more jobs in the interior. 
In the stimulus plan there was a particular emphasis on the construction of new railway 
lines, and it was reported that twenty million jobs were created just by railway projects 
alone (Chan). Since jobs are easier to find within migrants’ home province at wages not 
too far below coastal factory wages, there is less incentive to leave. Supporting this, 
preliminary evidence has shown that there has been a rise in intra-province migration to 
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seek work, as opposed to the once predominant inter-province travel (“Welcome Home”). 
In earlier years migrant workers faced impoverished conditions in their home localities 
and would leave their home out of necessity, but now that may no longer be the case. 
Whereas once it was clear that able workers must seek work elsewhere, the question of 
“Is it worth it?” has become fuzzier.  
Due to the working conditions, aging population, better living conditions in the 
interior, and especially in light of the high demand for migrant labor, the Chinese 
government is raising the minimum wage to encourage people to return back to the 
coastal production centers. Theoretically, this will help to rebalance the disparity between 
supply and demand for migrant labor, but only if the government is serious about 
enforcing the law. Recall that many migrants have reported not receiving their rightful 
compensation as stipulated in the 1994 Labor Law. If the government is serious about 
drawing more migrants back to the coastal production hubs, then it must continue to raise 
the minimum wage. 
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Chapter Five: Social Instability and the Minimum Wage Increase 
 
The government has created an official term to label all incidents of civil unrest, 
“mass incidents.” A common theme amongst all of the dissenters is that they are 
dissatisfied with the way in which they are being treated by the government. In the case 
of migrant workers, they are seeking more protection from the government for the 
injustices occurring in China’s factories. Specifically, the aim of migrant labor protests is 
to gain higher wages and better working conditions. The third reason the Chinese 
government is moving to raise the minimum wage is to improve social stability among 
migrants. In the short-run, this will deter future labor protests and safeguard the CCP’s 
political legitimacy, and in the long-run, this will facilitate a more overall socio-
politically stable society. 
 
Increasing Number of Protests 
 
Unlike the first generation of migrant workers, the second generation has been 
much more vocal about their concerns. The second generation of migrants is comprised 
of people aged sixteen to thirty. These people tend to be better educated than the previous 
generation and have higher expectations for their life. They are not satisfied with their 
current standard of living, but aspire to urban standards of living. With the absence of an 
effective labor union, migrants may feel that protest is the most effective way in which to 
get their voices heard. They have joined together in large and small-scale protests 
 throughout China to demonstrate their frus
relatively peaceful and limited to one enterprise. 
Incidents of civil unrest in China have been on the rise, including incidents of 
protests, demonstrations, walk
Jianrong Yu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the number of incidents 
rose tenfold from 1993 to 2005, with 8,709 and 87,000 incidents respectivel
table below shows the number of large
during the time of the Global Financial Crisis
 
Figure 8. 
 
(Source: Tong and Lei) 
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 A large-scale incident is an incident with 500 or more participants.
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Factory workers live and work in very close proximity, making the transmission 
of ideas and the ability to organize very simple. Also, the major factories are located near 
China’s most prominent and influential cities, placing the workers physically close to 
China’s top power holders. In addition, the internet provides a forum for disgruntled 
people to anonymously voice their opinions, which could potentially spark a collective 
movement. The internet has also helped people to gain a growing awareness of their 
rights. China has the most number of internet users of any country worldwide4, and the 
number of users is on the rise, as shown on the graph below.   
 
Figure 9. 
 
     (Source: World Bank) 
 
                                                          
4
 China currently has more than 470 million internet users, compared with 248 million in the U.S. 
(Worldbank).  
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As students of Marxist theory, communist leaders view labor unrest as a serious 
and potentially damaging issue. They are aware of their political vulnerabilities and are 
especially paranoid of a political overthrow. While the CCP maintains strict censorship 
laws and continues to avidly monitor the internet, people have still found ways to 
circumvent the censors. The CCP is conscious of the damage that the current labor strife 
could potentially have on China. Their main mechanism for conflict resolution is to 
silence the dissenters through strict media censorship and by quickly dispersing protests, 
but that is obviously not a long-term solution. 
 
Social Unrest: Past and Present 
 
The first major incident of widespread public protest since the beginning of the 
CCP regime in 1949 was the Tiananmen Square Protest which occurred from April until 
June of 1989 in Beijing. This now infamous event was a student-led pro-democracy 
demonstration that erupted after the death of the deposed politician Hu Yaobang. 
Grievances were aimed at the central government over a range of issues such as 
corruption, nepotism, poor job market, the lack of free press, and the slow pace of market 
reforms. On June 4th, the protest was brought to a violent end when the government took 
military action to disperse the protestors, resulting in hundreds or thousands of deaths 
across China’s capital city.  
However, none of the current protests have reached nearly this magnitude or 
sparked such global media attention, and all have been peaceful by comparison. The most 
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noteworthy migrant labor demonstration to date was a series of strikes that occurred at 
four Honda factories beginning on May 21, 2010. Approximately 1,900 workers in total 
were involved (Bradsher and Barboza). Like many other labor protests in China, the main 
objective was to receive a higher monthly wage. In an interview conducted by the New 
York Times one protestor stated, “If they give us 800 renminbi a month, we’ll go back to 
work right away” (Bradsher and Barboza). In the end, the striking workers were replaced 
with new incoming staff and factory management did raise the workers’ wages, though 
not to the full wage protestors were demanding.  
In addition to the protests conducted by unsatisfied migrant workers, another 
example of protest in China occurred on March 1, 2010 when a group of thirteen 
prominent Chinese newspapers published a joint editorial demanding the government put 
forward a clear timetable for the elimination of the hukou system. The editorial was titled 
“A Call for Accelerated Reforms to the Household Registration System to Truly Grant 
Rights to the People” and was published just before a meeting of the National People’s 
Congress. The article reprimanded the out datedness of the system and urged the 
government to take more aggressive action in eliminating the system. The following is a 
particularly poignant excerpt:  
The household registration system has divided cities and countryside. The first generation of 
migrant workers invested their labor into the development of the cities. However, their offspring 
still have no means to resolve the status of their identities. Their children still have to bear the 
quandary of the previous generation. The cities in which they live remain unable to accept them. 
We have to ask: for how many more generations must this divide last? (“A Call for Accelerated 
Reforms to the Household Registration System to Truly Grant Rights to the People”) 
 
The editorial was removed from the Internet by government censors within hours of its 
publishing, and the man who conceived the idea, Zhang Hong, who was editor-in-chief of 
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The Economic Observer at the time, was immediately removed from his position. The 
editorial is a unique example of protest in China because powerful societal figures do not 
often speak out against the government to defend the wellbeing of the lower class.  
 The large number of mass incidents in recent years has been a signal to the central 
government that they must do something to quell discontent. The government has been 
lucky that the incidents have been relatively isolated so far and that no unified movement 
has occurred. If unrest continues to grow, it may severely threaten the sociopolitical 
stability of the CCP regime. In order to ease tension amongst migrant workers, the central 
government has raised, and will continue to raise, China’s minimum wage. As long as the 
migrant workers receive fair, livable wages, mass incidents will most likely decline from 
this segment of the population. In the long-term, the central government must be more 
assertive to the people’s needs. Institutional reform must take place in order to reduce 
government corruption and increase popular trust of the government. In a book titled 
China: Fragile Superpower by UCSD political scientist Susan Shirk, she offered three 
possible steps the central government should take in order to stay in power: forestall 
large-scale popular protests, keep politburo leadership publicly united, and keep the army 
loyal to the government (Shirk). As long as the government takes proactive steps to 
address the needs of the people, China should hopefully see a decline in future unrest. 
Raising the minimum wage will appease migrant workers and create a more stable 
population. 
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Chapter Six: Implications and Conclusion 
 
As evidenced by the 12th Five Year Plan and other recent government 
publications, the CCP has made a decisive effort to promote a society that fosters 
inclusive growth, and raising the minimum wage is the first step to accomplishing that. It 
is a plan that will certainly change the structure of Chinese business. To this effect 
Stephen S. Roach of the Washington Post wrote:  
This plan is likely to go down in history as one of China's boldest strategic initiatives. In essence, 
it will change the character of China's economic model -- moving from the export- and 
investment-led structure of the past 30 years toward a pattern of growth that is driven increasingly 
by Chinese consumers. This shift will have profound implications for China, the rest of Asia, and 
the broader global economy (Roach). 
 
If minimum wage reforms are truly instituted, there will be significant change to 
the underlying cost structure of China’s export model. The implications will be wide 
sweeping. It will affect both consumers and producers of Chinese goods, everyone from 
Americans, Europeans and Chinese citizens to the countries that compete with China to 
produce low-cost goods, such as Mexico, India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam, just to name a 
few. As one of the most underprivileged segments of society, China’s migrant workers 
will benefit the most. They will have more disposable income, which will help spur 
domestic consumption and lessen China’s reliance on foreign demand for its exports. 
This chapter discusses the feasibility of the goals in the 12th Five Year Plan and offers a 
few intended and unintended implications that an increased minimum wage may have on 
migrant workers and the global economy. Furthermore, this chapter addresses topics 
related to China’s transitioning economy and the present status of the hukou system, and 
also speculates on the future of the hukou system.  
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Will the CCP Reach Its Goals?: 
 
The CCP’s goal in the 12th Five Year Plan to the raise the minimum wage by 
thirteen percent annually is clearly an ambitious goal. Is the CCP’s goal feasible or too 
aggressive? When looking at a variety of other factors, such as China’s annual 
government spending and the increasing inflation rate, in tandem with the thirteen 
percent increase, the goal does not seem as ambitious. For instance, according to the 
Heritage Fund, consolidated government spending is estimated to be about thirty percent 
of GDP, which means that they have room in their budget to increase spending on social 
welfare. Also, China has been experiencing increased inflation rates, meaning that an 
increased minimum wage is simply keeping migrant workers’ real wages in line with 
their previous real wage.  Also it is important to point out that the CCP places very high 
importance on meeting the goals of Five Year Plans. Historically, Five Year Plans have a 
good record of meeting or exceeding their proposed targets (KPMG). When looking at a 
multitude of factors, the CCP’s target to raise the minimum wage by at least thirteen 
percent each year for the next four years seems like a feasible objective.  
Another topic related to this is the feasibility of getting all Chinese companies to 
comply with the new minimum wage rates. As mentioned previously, the CCP has a 
well-known reputation for corruption within the regime, especially when it comes to 
business dealings. It is commonplace for businessmen to have close affiliations with their 
local CCP leaders, which may result in noncompliance with the law. In order for all 
migrant workers to attain higher wages, the CCP must take a proactive role in making 
sure that companies do indeed fulfill their obligation to pay their workers at least the 
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minimum wage set for their province. The CCP could accomplish this by setting severe 
fines for noncompliance and by establishing a well-developed task force to randomly 
inspect and audit companies. In the long-run, the CCP should proactively address the 
issue of rampant corruption within the party and establish a stronger rule of law.  
Eventually, this will help to establish greater popular trust of the government.  
 
Implications of the Increasing Minimum Wage: 
 
While some may argue that, in theory, an increased minimum wage may have the 
effect of raising the overall price of workers and thus pricing some workers out of the 
market, this is not applicable in the case of China. As stated previously, migrant workers’ 
wages historically have not reflected the productivity increases they have made. Over the 
past thirty years China’s export bundle has evolved considerably. It has gone from 
producing low-end manufactured goods to being capable of producing high-tech goods, 
and the export bundle is continually expanding in sophistication. For numerous reasons, 
namely the hukou system and the lack of a purposeful labor union, migrants have 
experienced suppressed bargaining power, and as a result their wages have been 
artificially low. Despite the productivity gains of migrant workers, factory owners have 
been reluctant to match this with paying out higher wages. So, the CCP is not disturbing 
market forces by increasing the minimum wage; raising the minimum wage will simply 
catch up to productivity increases, and will generally not have a negative effect on 
migrants’ employment rate.  
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In terms of the effect that an increased minimum wage will have on China’s 
export competitiveness for cheap, unsophisticated goods in the world market place, there 
will inevitably be some negative consequences that will vary by industry. Some 
authorities have expressed concern that companies may leave China in search of workers 
that will accept considerably lower wages. For instance, Vietnam’s highest monthly wage 
is just ninety-six dollars per month (American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam). The 
increasing wage rate may drive some companies that are very vulnerable to even tiny 
changes in input costs out of the marketplace.  So, the concern that China may lose some 
of their competitiveness is a valid concern, to an extent.  However, while it is 
unavoidable that wage hikes will translate into higher consumer prices and make China 
less attractive of a manufacturing center from one aspect, China still has some crucial 
advantages over its competitors. One of China’s chief advantages is that it has in place 
the necessary elements of a sophisticated supply chain, such as infrastructure and quality 
control, which other lesser-developed countries do not currently have in place. Countries 
like Vietnam may be able to set lower wages, but they often times do not have the 
required elements needed to run a successful supply chain.  
Additionally, while workers’ wages may be on the increase in China, one must 
also remember that their productivity levels are increasing as well. (Recall that between 
2000 and 2007 marginal product of labor increased by 178.7 percent) (Cai and Wang). In 
general, Chinese workers work more efficiently and produce more throughout the course 
of the day than workers in competing countries. Wage alone is not the only determinant 
of a country’s competitiveness, but the ratio of wage to labor productivity. China has and 
will continue to see the low-end manufacturing companies leave, but China still remains 
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competitive due to its superior supply chain and the productivity level of its workers. 
This is especially true in the high-end manufacturing sector. 
 There are positive long-term economic implications to be made by allocating 
more money to China’s migrant workers. Since the migrant population is a substantial 
portion of the population their increased purchasing power will stimulate domestic 
consumption. This will allow China to rely less on exports and more on internal 
consumption, which will help protect China against fluctuations in the world economy 
and future worldwide economic meltdowns. Also, in light of the fact that some 
enterprises in China have reported up to eighty percent labor turnover rates annually, a 
positive implication that will come out of higher wages will be higher retention rates. 
Over the long-term, this will allow factories to run more efficiently and cut down on 
labor training costs. Finally, the biggest implication of an increased minimum wage rate 
over the long-term is that it will structurally rebalance the national income disparities and 
quell the social unrest associated with that.  
 
The Hukou System Today: 
 
In the past decade the central government has made a few major attempts at 
reforming the system, though none were appreciably successful. Once again, the central 
government has recently revived its hukou reform efforts, especially in small and middle-
sized cities. In addition to the 12th Five Year Plan, reform initiatives were also outlined in 
a document by the State Council released on March 23, 2012. This document states that 
local governments are to offer all individuals that have worked for at least three years in 
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prefecture level cities the opportunity to register as an urban resident (Roberts). 
Furthermore, the document mandates that future policies regarding compulsory education, 
skill training and employment must not make urban hukou a means of exclusion 
(Roberts). In addition, Premier Wen Jiaobao has spoken publicly on numerous occasions 
about his opinion on the hukou system. For instance, when he addressed the National 
People’s Congress on March 5, 2012 Wen said that migrant laborers will become 
“permanent urban residents in an orderly manner” (Roberts). It appears that the recent 
speeches and documents supplied by the government demonstrate that the CCP is making 
a real attempt at improving the much outdated system, which will hopefully make major 
improvements in the lives of arguably China’s most underprivileged citizens, migrant 
workers.  
Despite the central government’s acknowledgement that the system must 
someday come to an end, there are immense structural barriers that stand in the way. Just 
three of the most significant barriers include: pressure on urban infrastructure, the way in 
which to deal with forfeiture of land rights that may be associated with urban hukou 
acquisition, and the financial burden of offering equal governmental services to all 
residents (“China: Update on Hukou Reforms”). Furthermore, the fact that the hukou 
system is administered at the provincial level poses an issue. While it is true that the 
central government is the foremost authority in China’s government structure, it has 
proven difficult to get all of the provinces on-board with hukou reform because of the 
immense financial burden that will be placed on the provincial governments. Increased 
urbanization forces the provincial governments to spend extra money on urban 
infrastructure and government subsidized social services. For instance, The Board 
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Chairman of the China Institute for Reform and Development (CIRD) estimates that for 
every percentage point increase in China’s urbanization rate, 971 billion dollars must be 
spent on fixed infrastructure (“Rural/Urban Divide”).  
Nevertheless, some provinces have begun to implement pilot programs for reform 
that would allow for some rural migrant workers to gain urban hukou in the province in 
which they have been working. Notable pilot programs include those being carried out in 
Chonqing, Chengdu, and Guangzhou, as shown in the figure below.  
Figure 10. 
Pilot Programs for Hukou Reform 
 Guangdong Chongqing Chengdu 
Policy 
Announcement 
Date 
June 2010 July 2010 November 2010 
Urbanization 
Target Rate 
75% in Guangzhou, 
85% in other cities 
by 2020 
60% by 2020 70% by 2020 
Number of People 
to transfer 
.6 million quota 
every year 
10 million by 2020 Not specified 
How to transfer Cumulative Points 
System: migrant 
workers with 60 
points or more are 
eligible to apply. 
Points are awarded 
based on education, 
skills, social 
insurance 
contributions, social 
contributions (such 
as blood donating 
and volunteer 
work). 
Rural residents who 
have worked or run 
a business in 
downtown 
Chongqing for at 
least five years or 
have purchased 
commercial housing 
in downtown area 
can apply for urban 
hukou.  
Anyone with a 
residence in an 
urban area can apply 
for an urban hukou 
on a voluntary basis.  
 
Social Security  Yes, after 
transferring to urban 
hukou 
Yes, after 
transferring to urban 
hukou 
No need to apply, 
automatic.  
(Source: Compiled by author) 
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The reforms in these cities are similar in nature, but have different procedures on how to 
obtain an urban hukou. To date, no coordinated nation-wide reform program has taken 
place. In addition to gaining an urban hukou legally through provincial governments, 
there is also a very active black market for attaining urban hukou. Purchasing a hukou in 
one of China’s most desired cities can run as high as 150,000 yuan (Roberts). With such a 
high price tag, buying an urban hukou is reserved for China’s wealthiest migrants. 
  
Future of the Hukou System: 
 
A general consensus has been reached that it is an outdated system that no longer 
serves society’s best interest, but policymakers and academics have not come up with a 
singular, nation-wide solution on how to eliminate it. One of the biggest 
counterarguments to eliminating the system is that it is the only thing standing in the way 
of a massive rush to the cities, which would create overcrowding and overwhelm the 
infrastructure. The elimination process is an extremely daunting task because it involves 
reforming a system that has been a key aspect of Chinese society for over fifty years. 
Policymakers and academics are split on how to best approach the devolution of the 
system. One school of thought is that the government should gradually minimize the 
difference in the rights associated with urban and rural hukou membership. In other 
words, migrant hukou holders would get gradual access to education, healthcare, social 
insurance, government funded housing, as well as other benefits that urban hukou holders 
have. The other school of thought is that the government should progressively grant 
urban hukou membership (and the associated benefits) to those migrants currently living 
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in cities. Both methods are similar in nature, but from a personal perspective, the latter 
school of thought is a superior route to take.  
After examining the pilot reform programs that have occurred throughout China, 
especially the pilot programs currently being carried out in Chonqing, Chengdu, and 
Guangzhou, figure 11 is a compiled list of the best practices from each reform program. 
The first of the two columns represents changes to the hukou system that should take 
place immediately, and the second column represents changes that should take place 
gradually in the future. The implementation path designed in figure 11 is aggressive yet 
very realistic and would improve the nation on a number of levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 11. 
At the present, true nation
rooted in society, and much too costly for the government to handle right now. However, 
it is inevitable that the hukou
minimum wage is a decisive victory low paid workers. A higher 
first step to eroding the hukou
prevents migrants from fully integrating and living happily in urban society: money. With 
more and more disposable income, migrants will someday be able to access the basic 
services that were once not available to them by paying for them privately. They will 
Short-term
•1. Immediately build more 
urban infrastructure to 
withstand increased population.
•2. Make immediate budgetary 
sanctions to ensure that all the 
children of migrant workers 
that are currently living in cities 
have proper access to 
education. 
•3. Establish heavy penalties for 
people who take advantage of 
those in the process of 
transferring to urban hukous, 
including land developers and 
corrupt government officials. 
•4. Make significant effort to 
invest more money in building 
infrastructure and industry in 
the rural provinces. This will 
give people an incentive to 
remain in the countryside and 
will hopefully help to ease a 
potential mass rush to the cities.
Source: Created by author
Proposal for Hukou Reform
-wide hukou reform seems far-off. It is too deeply 
 system will not persist forever, and the effort to increase the 
minimum wage
 system because it addresses the biggest barrier that 
Long-term
•1. Make the system centralized 
so that it is administered at the 
national level. This will 
decrease dependency on local 
governments to adhere to the 
regulations and make the 
implementation process more 
uniform.
•2. Continue to construct more 
urban infrastructure to 
accomodate more urban 
population, including public 
housing, transportation, 
medical institutions, and 
schools. 
•3. Grant urban hukou 
membership to migrants 
currently living in cities, and 
then eventually equalize 
benefits to rural hukou 
members.
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 is the 
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enjoy a higher standard of living and contribute more proportionately to urban 
consumption. Someday they will actually be able to consume the goods they work so 
hard to produce.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
The cluster of suicides at Foxconn in 2010 was nothing short of a tragedy, but one 
good side that came out of it was that it sparked worldwide attention on the way in which 
migrant workers are treated in China’s factories. On February 13, 2012 the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) began a large-scale two week long inspection of four Foxconn plants 
to ensure that it had kept its promise of change. The FLA conducted approximately 
35,000 one-on-one interviews; interview questions were wide-ranging and included 
topics related to working hours, health, safety, dorm life, and management (Barboza 
2012).  
In the wake of the suicide cluster Apple promised to make major changes at 
Foxconn plants, but apparently Apple did not fully follow through on its promises. It 
appears that the progress they made in the weeks and months following the suicides was 
short-lived. During the FLA investigation it was found that the plants were in violation of 
numerous Chinese laws and regulations. In addition, the FLA found that forty-three 
percent of workers had been involved with or seen an accident, and furthermore nearly 
two-thirds of the employees stated that their income “does not meet their basic needs” 
(Barboza 2012). Once again, the electronics magnate has pledged to improve the lives of 
the factory workers by further raising wages and instating more safety features, but the 
validity of their claims have been seriously called into question. This is why the 
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government has and must continue to take matters into its own hands by raising the 
minimum wage, because apparently companies are not willing to change on their own.  
The troubles at Foxconn highlight the importance of greater government 
supervision of China’s labor market. The government must step in and take a firm stance 
on instances of noncompliance with the law. It is very important to the lives of millions 
of migrant workers that the government follows through on its promise to significantly 
raise the minimum wage, and there is much evidence to believe that it will. The CCP 
must continue to strengthen its rule of law and honor its commitments. Why has the 
central government decided to raise the minimum wage now? The answer is clear: to 
rebalance China’s socioeconomic structure, to address the gap between labor supply and 
demand in the coastal production centers, and to address the widespread unrest amongst 
migrant workers. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Urbanization in China (urbanites as % of population) 
 
Period China’s Urbanization 
Pre-PRC: Small and slow 
urbanization 
 
1843 5.1 
1893 6.0 
1949      7.7 
PRC- Mao Era: Stagnation  
1953     12.0 
1961     16.1 
1965     14.0 
1976     13.0 
PRC- Reform Era: Rapid 
urbanization 
 
1978     12.9 
1988     18.7 
2000     26.1 (33.8) 
Easter/coastal China     41.9 
Rest of China     16.1 
(Source: Wang) 
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Figure 7. 
 
 (Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China) 
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